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TORTS
Ralph Michael S t e w

This Article surveys the most significant torts cases decided in
the courts of New York State during the Survey year. Only cases
which challenged existing law, modified longstanding doctrine, or announced new decisional law have been included. While 1989 was not
a year of signal change for the law of torts, a number of cases deserve
examination and analysis.

A. Governmental Liability
Perhaps the most interesting case concerning governmental liability, and in some ways potentially the most far reaching, was the
Court of Appeals per curiam decision in Cowles v. Brownell.1 New
York's highest court brought to a crashing halt the common practice
of prosecutors and police that required liability releases from criminal
defendants as the price of consent by the prosecutor to a dismissal of
charges. While not applied to major crimes, this practice was commonly used for misdemeanors and violations. The Court of Appeals
was correct in dismissing questions of voluntariness as basically irrelevant, and instead directing its focus on the perceived unfairness of the
practice.= The releases invalidated in Cowles exposed prosecutors and
police alike to possible conflict of interest problems, while virtually
insuring the appearance of impropriety.3 While there is much in this

t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D. Hofstra University School
of Law; B.A. New School for Social Research.
1. 73 N.Y.2d 382, 538 N.E.2d 325, 540 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1989).
2. Cowles, 73 N.Y.2d at 386, 538 N.E.2d at 327, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
3. Id. These releases have, understandably, been extremely popular with police officials who fear tort litigation and who often must defend actions which were undertaken
in good faith and in reasonable reliance on a citizen's complaint. The author interviewed
a major leader in the police profession in New York State, Donald L. Singer, Chief of the
Greenburgh Police Department. Chief Singer, who is also a member of the New York
Bar, stated that the Court of Appeals decision in Cowles
m s good for law enforcement in the long run because it will ensure that police
and prosecutorial behavior is more professionally discharged. There may be
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case of interest to members of the criminal defense and prosecution
bar, its significance for tort lawyers is that they will no longer have to
face contesting the validity of a waiver in attempting to prove an underlying case of false arrest.4
A divided Court of Appeals wrestled with the recurring issue of
municipal liability to persons injured by third parties on public property in Bonner v. City of New York.5 New York, like many jurisdictions, has limited the liability of the governmental entity as owner and
operator of facilities when persons are injured by individuals not employed by the owner. In Bonner, a teacher suffered injuries at the
hands of an assaultive child while the teacher was discharging supervisory duties in a playgr~und.~
The plaintiff sustained injuries when a
person removed from the playground had returned through a gate
which was not in good order.'
New York distinguishes between a governmental entity acting in
its official capacity and exercising discretionary, policy-based functions, and the same agency operating in a real or quasi-proprietary
form.8 As with so many legal rules, the statement of the rule is easy
to the point of facility while its application invites disputed analysis.
Four Court of Appeals' judges found the operation of the gate in Bonner to fall within the governmental function of the defendant city and

more protracted litigation since the release cannot be used as a quick knock-out
punch but the sense of coercion which these releases created, intentionally or
otherwise, reflected badly on the police profession and, in the long run, did little
to offset well-founded claims of improper police behayior.
Interview with Donald L. Singer, Chief of the Greenburgh Police Department @ec. 11,
1989).
4. Because many of the false arrest claims are also brought as federal civil rights
suits, these waivers have been of little effect and were often sidestepped by alleging federal
causes of action.
5. 73 N.Y.2d 930, 536 N.E.2d 1147, 539 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1989).
6. Bonner, 73 N.Y.2d at 931-32, 536 N.E.2d at 1148, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
7. Id. at 934, 536 N.E.2d at 1150, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 731. The plaintitfwas, of course,
engaged in his assigned duties. Municipal government strongly opposes the imposition of
new liabiity or the extension of existing parameters of liability for injuries to employees
by third parties. New York courts have struggled with this issue for years, unwilling to
recognize a general duty to the victim and equally unwilling to slam shut any possibility
of relief under any set of facts. The current balancing act of weighing proprietary against
governmental functions produces little guidance for resolving future issues because of the
extreme importance of facts in the structure of liability, or non-liability, created by the
current and somewhat shifting doctrine.
8. To a large extent, the governmental agency can insulate itself from liability by the
way it characterizes its functions. Judicial scrutiny of this issue appears to be, generally,
shallow.
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board of education, thereby insulating the government from liability.
Judge Simons and Chief Judge Wachtler, however, recognized in dissent that "it is difficult to draw the line between claims resting upon a
breach of a proprietary duty and those resting upon a governmental
duty"9 and directed their focus on the alleged specific act of omission
or commission to determine the classification of the act. Under that
analysis, the failure to maintain the gate was viewed by the dissenters
as the failure of, in essence, a common landlord and thus not subject
to the shielding effect of immunity.10
Although Bonner may be viewed as a "close call," the author
believes that the dissenters, by focusing on the facts of the alleged
negligence leading to plaintiff's injury, have the better argument.
Having relinquished its sovereign immunity, the state and its subdivisions should not be sheltered from the results of acts bearing no relation to the establishment of policy, but rather which reflect individual
systemic shortcomings and failures.
A divided Court of Appeals in Kircher v. City of Jamestown,ll
citing, among many other cases, Bonner,l2 applied the special relationship test to defeat a rape victim's claim that police failure to respond to a report of her abduction led to her being raped with
resultant physical injuries. These cases arise, both in actuality and in
law, with distressing frequency. While the failure of the police to follow a reasonable standard of care may not be hard to prove, the plaintiff is usually headed off at the pass, or simply kept from even entering
it, by the threshold duty issue.
While the Kircher majority's opinion is rooted firmly in decisional law largely formulated to insulate government from this type of
liability, Judge Bellacosa's dissent, cogent in reasoning and penetrating in policy dissection, presents a fundamentally fairer resolution.
Noting that the victim in this case directly appealed for help and got
the attention of passersby who noted her predicament and immediately flagged down a police officer, Judge Bellacosa in effect argues for
-

9. 73 N.Y.2d at 934, 536 N.E.2d at 1150, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 731 (Simon~,J., and
Wachtler, C.J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 934-35, 536 N.E.2d at 1150, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 731 (Simons, J., and Wachtler, C.J., dissenting).
11. 74 N.Y.2d 251, 543 N.E.2d 443, 544 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1989).
12. 73 N.Y.2d 930, 536 N.E.2d 1147, 539 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1989); see also Logan v.
City of New York, 148 A.D.2d 167, 543 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1st Dep't 1989).
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a special relationship by proxy.13 The police officers dismissed the
whole event as a probable squabble and did little, in fact nothing,
else.14 By depending on the passersby who were aware of the victim's
plight and relayed information to the police, Judge Bellacosa suggests
the formation of a special duty by vicarious process.15 Essentially,
Judge Bellacosa is dismayed by the majority's adherence to an overly
rigid doctrine at the expense of recognizing the need to apply tort law
to both redress victims and deter future conduct of this kind by law
enforcement agencies. l6

B.

General Negligence

New York, by statute," encourages the use of some privatelyowned real property for recreational purposes by precluding liability
against the owner by persons using the land for recreation. In lannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,l8 the Court of Appeals, reversing
both the trial and appellate courts, found New York General Obligations Law section 9-103 applicable and insulated the railroad from
liability. The plaintiff, who was operating a trail bike when he was
injured, alleged ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant.19
The majority found that the use of the property as an active commercial site did not deprive the defendant of the sheltering protection of
the recreational use statute.20 Judge Simons, in dissent, argued that
the property was unsuitable for any form of recreation and was thus
outside the intent and scope of the stat~te.2~
While recourse to the plain language of the statute is unhelpful
here, it seems the point of contention between the majority and the
dissent lies in whether the focus is on the actual use being made of the
13. Kircher, 74 N.Y.2d at 265-66, 543 N.E.2d at 451-52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 263, 543 N.E.2d at 450, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 265-66, 543 N.E.2d at 451-52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). The vicarious process advocated by Judge Bellawsa eliminated the necessity of
finding reliance by the victim upon the alleged tortfeasor which is normally required in
such cases, by substituting the reliance by the passersby that the officer would intercede
to help the victim, thus eliminating the direct contact requirement.
16. Id. at 265-66, 543 N.E.2d at 451-52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
17. N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.LAW5 9-103 (McKinney 1989).
18. 74 N.Y.2d 39, 542 N.E.2d 621, 544 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1989).
19. Iannofti, 74 N.Y.2d at 41-42, 542 N.E.2d at 622-23, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
20. Id at 47, 542 N.E.2d at 625, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
21. Id. at 52, 542 N.E.2d at 628, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 315 (Simons, J., dissenting).
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property at the time of the accident (majority), or its objective unsuitability for such use (dissent).
Judge Simon's reasoning is more persuasive because under suitability analysis, a defendant does not benefit from the inappropriate or
aberrational use of his land. The statute seems to have been enacted
with the intent to encourage recreational use of private property and
it seems illogical that the legislature wished to encourage the inappropriate use of real property.
It also seems quite likely that both in Iannotti and factually similar cases, withdrawal of the recreational use statute from the defendant will not result in a plaintiff's verdict. The evident unsuitability of
the property for the use which resulted in injury will probably suffice
to demonstrate that the plaintiff was proximately liable for her own
injuries.
The common law has dealt with issues of pursuing animals onto
neighbors' property since the Middle Ages. A cow pursuit in Albany
County led to plaintiff's injuries on defendant's property in Persons v.
Cross.22 The Third Department panel found that neighbors could
neither foresee nor guard against the hot pursuit of cows at night by
persons unfamiliar with the terrain.23
Urban, suburban, and probably nual New York are increasingly
"wired" for burglary and fire alarms and litigation following the failure of an alarm system is becoming common. While such actions frequently have a contract basis, causes of action in tort often appear and
may predominate. During the Survey year, both the First and Second
Departments considered alarm failure cases and, applying different
reasoning, reached opposite conclusions. In Koos Van Den Akker
Atelier v. Honeywell,24 the First Department applied a contract liability limitation clause to defeat the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's
negligence led to a successful burglary. In Gentile v. Garden City
Alarm Co.,25 however, a similar clause failed to protect the defendant
alarm system installer when the system failed, the plaintiff's premises
were subsequently burglarized, and the plaintiff's daughter was assaulted and injured. The distinction between the two cases was the
Gentile court's finding that the negligence of the defendant was gross

22.
23.
24.
25.

146 A.D.2d 892, 536 N.Y.S.2d 597 (3d Dep't 1989).
Persons, 146 A.D.2d at 893, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
148 A.D.2d 359, 539 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep't 1989).
147 A.D.2d 124, 541 N.Y.S.2d 505 (2d Dep't 1989).
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rather than ordinary and that exculpatory clauses were void under
such circumstances.26 Despite the difference in negligence standards,
the facts in the two cases do not suggest any real difference in negligence between the two defendant^.^'
A recurrent and particularly horrific type of negligence case
found in advance sheets every year involves swimming pool diving
accidents in which the plaintiffs, almost invariably young people, are
rendered quadriplegic as a result. This year was no exception with
Denkenshohn v. Davenport28 and Kriz v. Schum,29 reported from the
Third and Fourth Departments respectively. A unifying characteristic of these cases is that they are brought both as negligence actions,
usually against the owner of the pool, and as product liability actions.
There is enough case law in which such actions against pool manufacturers are dismissed or defeated to suggest that automatically bringing
actions against such defendants may border on the sanctionable. As
in the two cases this year, the pool manufacturer has put out an honest product which may be prone to misuse and is often misused. In
both of the actions this year, the victim is probably the sole cause of
the injuries incurred, and while a colorable cause of action against the
owner may be stated, and in some instances proved, inclusion of the
pool manufacturer is abusive.

C Products Liabilify
The past Survey year did not see many significant products liability cases which changed the course of this area of tort law.30 A case
involving diethystilbestrol ("DES') merits attention. In the nationally noted and commented upon case of Hymowitz v. Eli LiZb & Co. ,31
New York's highest court determined that when plaintiffs could not
determine the identiiication of the manufacturer of the DES adminis26. Gentile, 147 A.D.2d at 130-31, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 509-10.
27. The alarm industry is growing rapidly and is subject, generally, to local or
county regulation, and not much of that at best. This is a potential area of major liability
analysis, especially since the alarm senices sell both sophisticated equipment and high
expectations of performance. The standard contract exculpatory clauses may fall to tort
analysis which delines the right of a purchaser or lessor of such a system to minimal
standards of reasonable competence in providing equipment, maintaining a system, and
delivering the degree of security reasonably anticipated by the consumer.
28. 144 A.D.2d 58, 536 N.Y.S.2d 587 (3d Dep't 1989).
29. 145 A.D.2d 985, 536 N.Y.S.2d 356 (4th Dep't 1988).
30. See also Donnelly & Donnelly, Commercial Law, 1989 Survey of N.Y; Law, 41
SYRACUSE
L. REV.125 (1990), for additional discussion of products liability cases.
31. 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).
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tered to a parent, a market share theory was appropriate for finding
liability and securing damages.s2
Hymowitz is a concerted action case, but the only true concerted
action of the numerous defendants in this and other DES cases is that
they supplied a market demand at a common point in history.33 Chief
Judge Wachtler's opinion is a model of clarity as he charts the course
of litigation that reflects hundreds of injury claims based on decadeold ingestion of DES.
As Judge Wachtler notes, DES cases are a subject unto themselves and, in fact, the window of liability has a clear, predictable closure based upon the withdrawal of the substance from use. In
essence, the court's concert of action theory is as sui generis as the
underlying problem is unique. The parallels in market development
and distribution found in the history of DES are unprecedented in
other products liability drug litigation.34 Hymowitz is as close to a
self-confessed, result-oriented decision as one can hope to find, yet it
embodies a rational and defensible theory of liability based on known
market shares and profits.

D. Medical Malpractice
In McDougald v. Garber,35 the New York Court of Appeals established that loss of enjoyment of life was not a separate category of
recovery which could be divorced from conscious pain and suffering,
and that a person unaware of pain and suffering because of neurological damage was similarly unaware of loss of enjoyment of life. The
plaintiff, at the age of thirty-one, went into an irreversible coma as a
result of medical malpractice while she underwent a combined caesarian section and tubal ligation.36 Chief Judge Wachtler found that
"cognitive awareness is a prerequisite to recovery for loss of enjoyment of life."37
In Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical,38 the Court of Appeals held

32. Hymowitz, 7 3 N.Y.2d at 51 1, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
33. Id. at 51 1-12, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
34. Id. at 507-08, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
35. 73 N.Y.2d 246, 254, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1989).
36. McDougald, 73 N.Y.2d at 251, 536 N.E.2d at 373, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
37. Id. at 255, 536 N.E.2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
38. 7 2 N.Y.2d 632, 532 N.E.2d 1239, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1 1 (1988). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts defines a superseding cause as "an act of a third person or other force
which by its intervention prevents the actor from beiig liable for harm to another which
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that a woman's choice to have an abortion rather than to face the
possiblity of bearing a congenitally defective child because of her doctor's negligence in prescribing medication when she was pregnant
could not constitute a superseding cause, as a matter of law. The doctor's liability for the alleged negligence has to be analyzed without
reference to the plaintiff's having exercised her right to secure an elective ab0rtion.~9
Issues over the requirement for a medical malpractice panelm are
reported each year due to the fact that New York has not yet moved
to abolish these largely useless panels. Counsel for plaintiffs generally
tries to dispense with the panel whenever possible. A major basis for
dispensing with the panel is that the gravamen of the plaintiff's case
sounds in ordinary negligence rather than in medical malpractice.
In BorriZZo v. Beekman Downtown Ho~pital,~l
the Second Department affirmed the trial court's grant of the plaintiff's motion to dispense with the panel when the underlying negligence of the defendant
resulted in an assault on the plaints by a fellow patient. A panel
could offer no special expertise under those facts.42
Psychiatric malpractice cases are often dficult because they do
not have a foundation in clinical medicine, usually reflect no objective
scientific evidence, and are often brought by plaintiffs with past or
present serious emotional and mental ills. Noto v. St. Vincent's Hospital & Medical Center,43 is just such a case. The defendant-psychiatrist
did not deny that he had an affair with the plaints but he denied that
the sexual relationship occurred during the course of his treatment of
her for depression, alcohol and drug dependence, and seductive behavior.44 The defendant-hospital's motion for summary judgment
was granted by the trial court. In this case, apparently a case of first
impression, the trial judge found that a hospital bears no possible liability for a staff doctor's pursuit of his own amatory interests where
the hospital had no knowledge of his pursuit of and involvement with
a patient.45
his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." W. PROSSER
& P.
KEETON,PROSSER
ON TORTS271 (4th ed. 1971).
39. Lynch, 72 N.Y.2d at 637, 532 N.E.2d at 1242, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
40. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990).
41. 146 A.D.2d 734, 537 N.Y.S.2d 219 (2d Dep't 1989).
42. BommZZo,146 A.D.2d at 735, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
43. 142 Misc. 2d 292, 537 N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988).
44. Noto, 142 Misc. 2d at 294, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
45. Id at 297, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
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The doctrine of res ipsa Ioquitor was applied in Kerber v. S a r l e ~ , ~ ~
when the Fourth Department reversed the grant of summary judgment by the trial court on behalf of the defendant-podiatrist. The
plaintiff underwent foot surgery and awoke from anesthesia to discover her front teeth missing.47 No rationale for the trial court's
grant of summary judgment appears, but the facts clearly demonstrate, as the appellate panel noted, a classic res ipsa loquitor situation.
The plaintiff certainly is not in a position to know what happened, the
defendants are not admitting anything, and teeth do not become dislodged during foot surgery ordinarily but for someone's negligence.

E. Intentional Torts
In past Survey articles, this author has lamented the practice of
lawyers alleging prima facie tort as a "boilerplate" intentional tort
cause of action. This arcane tort is rarely colorably pleaded and dismissal of the cause of action is the rule, not the exception. This is the
first Survey year where this author encountered no reported cases of
trial or appellate court dismissals of prima facie tort causes of action.
Similarly, there appears to be a consistent downturn in the
number of cases considered by New York's courts under section 5 1 of
the Civil Rights Act, New York's narrow and inadequate substitute
for the broad-based invasion of privacy cause of action recognized in
virtually every other jurisdiction. In a diversity action, the Second
Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment by the trial court
and found that a genuine issue of fact required resolution.48 Section
51 of the Civil Rights Law allows for both money damages and injunctive relief when a person's likeness is used without authorization
for purposes of trade or advertisement as opposed to use by the news
media.49 In the diversity action, Titan Sports, litc. v. Comics World
Corp., the plaintiff, who both promoted and managed such famous
wrestlers as Hulk Hogan, "Macho Man" Savage, and similar luminaries objected to the inclusion of poster-type color photos of these
wrestling greats in the defendant's publication.50 The photos were
bound into the publication as posters which could only be viewed by a

46. 151 A.D.2d 1031,542 N.Y.S.2d 94, appeal after remand, 151 A.D.2d 1032,544
N.Y.S.2d 522 (4th Dep't 1989).
47. Id.
48. 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).
49. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTSLAW 5 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1990).
50. Titan Sports, 870 F.2d at 87.
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reader by removing them entirely from the magazine. In a short but
cogent restatement of New York law, the Second Circuit recognized
that first amendment issues were raised by the type and location of the
offending photo-posters which required a treatment by the trial court
other than summary judgment.51
Two libel actions are worthy of note. In Immuno A.G. v. Moor
Jankowski,52 a libel action arising from the publication of a letter to
the editor of a scientific journal, in which the plaintiff was assailed for
his proposed research in hepatitis using captured wild chimpanzees.
The animal rights movement is a highly visible and active element in
public discourse today, and researchers who employ animals, wild or
domestic, for experimentation, often face a panoply of challenges,
legal and otherwise. In this instance, the researcher attacked by alleging that he had been defamed by the letter. The trial court denied
summary judgment for the defendant, incorrectly, as it turned out, in
the view of the appellate panel. The First Department noted that an
examination of the allegations and the claimed libel showed that the
statements were matters of opinion on events of public interest and
that they were incapable of being proven false by the plaintiff.53 Thus,
the expressions were fully protected by the first amendment of the
United States Constitution and summary judgment was appropriate.54
While not setting forth new law, presiding Judge Murphy's opinion for the panel is an excellent restatement of the governing first
amendment principles which insulate participants in the public market of controveries and ideas not only from judgments for damages
but from protracted and expensive litigation. The hesitancy of trial
courts to grant summary judgment in libel cases involving alleged
defamations embodying complex issues and facts should yield, as it
should have in this action, to the predominant concern of preventing
a libel action from chilling defendants expressions, actual or potential.
Opinions about the sartorial splendor of a testifying psychologist,
published in a nonfiction book, are just that, ruled the First Department in granting summary judgment for a defendant in a libel action
and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. In Weiner v. Doubleday &

51. Id. at 88.
52. 145 A.D.2d 114, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 74 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549
N.E.2d 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1989).
53. Immuno A.G., 145 A.D.2d at 143, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
54. Id., at 144, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
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Co. ,55 the defendant described the plaintiff as "eccentrically costumed
in bright red slacks and a loud plaid jacketyywhen testifying in a divorce action.56 This is clearly a protected expression of opinion, assuming, of course, that the plaintiff was not wearing conservative
business clothing while testifying.

The common law of torts remains a viable vehicle for protecting
individuals against various and sundry harms. New York's courts
were very active in 1989 applying existing law, especially in the area
of excessive damages. Unfortunately, the past Survey year was not
marked by exciting doctrinal developments. While the New York
Court of Appeals is beginning to attract significant national attention
for its scholarly and persuasive development of state constitutional
law, torts seems to be, perhaps only temporarily, relegated to a backwater. Perhaps 1990 will be different.

55. See Weiner v. Doubleday & Co., 142 A.D.2d 100, 535 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1st Dep't
1988).
56. Weiner, 142 A.D.2d at 105, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
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